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THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR RULE AND ITS
EXCEPTIONS-MAY A CONTRACTEE OWE DIFFERING
DUTIES TO CERTAIN CLASSES OF PERSONS INJURED
BY AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR?
The general rule as developed at the common law is that a contractee
is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor.' Although this
rule of immunity has been subject to increasing criticism, 2 the greatest
inroad into the contractee's immunity from liability for the acts of the
independent contractor has been by judicially constructed real and
apparent exceptions. 3 Most American jurisdictions have recognized the
various exceptions in one form or another, but the courts disagree as
to whom these exceptions are to apply.
There are three classes of persons to whom the contractee may owe
a duty under these exceptions: (1) the employees of the contractee, (2)
the employees of the contractor, and (3) third parties. With the enact-
ment of Workmen's Compensation Acts, the contractee's common law
duties to his own employees under these exceptions are no longer rele-
vant.4 Therefore, this note will only consider the question of whether
the exceptions to the independent contractor rule of nonliability apply
to employees of the contractor as well as to third parties injured by the
independent contractor.
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965) [hereinafter cited as TORTS];
PROSSER, LAW Or TORTS 480 (3rd ed. 1964); 2 HARPER & JAMES, LAW OF TORTS §
26.11 (1956); 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 584 (1948; AM. JUR. Independent
Contractor § 27 (1940); Neyman v. Pincus, 82 Mont. 467, 267 P. 805 (1928).
The usual justification for the general rule is that, "since the (contractee) has no
power of control over the manner in which the work is to be done by the contractor,
it is to be regarded as the contractor's own enterprise, and he, rather than the
(contractee), is the proper party to be charged with the responsibility of preventing
the risk, and bearing and distributing it." TORTS § 409, comment b at 370.
'For accounts of the development and critical treatments of this general rule see;
Douglas Vicarious Liability and Administration of the 1?isk, 38 YALE, L. J. 584, 594
Chapman, Liability for the Negligence of Independent Contractors, 50 L. Q. REV.
71 (1934), (English development); Morris, Torts of an Independent Contractor, 19
ILL. L. REV. 339 (1934); NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT, RECOM-
MENDATIONS AND STUDIES, 419-421 (1939); Annot., 19 A.L.R. 226 (1922);Annot.,
20 A.L.R. 684 (1922).
"The number of exceptions made by the English courts has reached the point that
today the position of the ordinary independent contractor in England approaches
that of a servant. The American courts have not gone so far, although the trend
is definitely in that direction: "Now, obviously, we are moving ultimately in the
direction of some liability for the torts of an independent contractor which will
approach, if it doesn't quite reach, liability for the torts of an agent or servant."
38 ALI PROCEEDINGS 124 (1961).
4REvISEE CODES OP MONTANA 1947 [hereinafter cited as R.C.M.1947] § 92-204
states: ''Where both the employer and employee have elected to come under this
act, the provisions of this act shall be exclusive, and such election shall be held to
be a surrender by such employer and the servants, and employees of such employer
and such employee, as among themselves, of their right to any other method, form
or kind of compensation, or determination thereof, or to any other compensation,
or kind of determination thereof, or cause of action, action at law, suit in equity,
or statutory or common-law right or remedy .... "
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REAL AND APPARENT EXCEPTIONS
Before considering the case law on this question, it is necessary
to consider what these exceptions are, particularly the distinction between
the apparent and the real exceptions. The Restatement has recognized
some twenty-three exceptional situations in which the contractee is
found to be liable for the torts of the independent contractor.5 Because
these exceptions have developed, and have tended to be stated, as par-
ticular detailed rules for particular situations, it is difficult to make any
general statements concerning them. The exceptions can, however, be
grouped into two broad categories.6
In the first category are the apparent exceptions, those involving
the personal negligence of the contractee in selecting, instructing, or
supervising the contractor. According to the Restatement:
In such a case, the employer's liability must be based upon his own
personal negligence in failing to exercise reasonable care in giving
the orders or directions in pursuance of which the work is to be
done (see section 410); to exercise reasonable care to employ only
contractors competent to do the work with reasonable assurance of
safety to others (see section 411); to exercise reasonable care in
inspecting the work after it is done or, in certain cases, during
its progress, in order to see that the work is so done as to secure
the safety of others (see section 412); to exercise reasonable care
to provide for the taking of such precautions, either by the contractor
whom he employs or otherwise, as in advance are recognizable
as necessary to enable the work to be safely done (see section 413);
to exercise with reasonable care such control over the doing of
the work as he retains to himself (see section 414); to exercise
reasonable care in supervising the equipment and methods of persons
doing work or carying on activities upon his land (see sections 414
A and 415).'
In the second category are the real exceptions, those involving non-
delegable duties of the contractee, arising out of some relation toward the
public or the particular plaintiff.8 In contrast to the apparent excep-
tions, the real exceptions do not rest upon any personal negligence of
the contractee. "They are rules of vicarious liability, making the [con-
tractee] liable for the negligence of the independent contractor, irre-
spective of whether the [contractee] has himself been at fault."9 The
5ToRTs, Ch. 15. The number of exceptions has increased to the point that the rule
can now be said to be IIgeneral"I only in the sense that it is applied where no good
reason is found for departing from it. TORTS § 409, comment b at 370. Indeed
it would be proper to say that the rule is now primarily important as a preamble
to the catalog of its exceptions. Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co.,
201 Minn. 500, 277 N. W. 226 (1937).
6Some authorities include a third category for the exception to the rule of immunity
involving work which is inherently dangerous (See TORTS § 409, comment b
at 370). Since this exception may be rationalized in terms of non-delegable duty(which many courts do), it is included in the second category for purposes of this
note. ,
7TORTS § 410-415.
-1d. § 416-429.
OId., Ch. 15, Topic 2, Introductory Note.
[Vol. 31
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real exceptions are considered as non-delegable duties because they grise
in situations in which, for reasons of policy, the contractee is not per-
mitted to shift the responsibility for the proper conduct of the work
to the contractor.
THE STATE OF THE LAW
The case law pertaining to the question of whether these exceptions
apply to the employees of the independent contractor as well as to third
parties is in irreconcilable conflict. Some jurisdictions reject any duty
at all on the part of the contractee to employees of the independent
contractor; 1° other jurisdictions hold that some exceptions extend to
employees of the independent contractor, but other exceptions do not ;"i
still other jurisdictions find that the duties of the contractee owed to
employees of the independent contractor are the same as those owed to
third parties.1 2
Corpus Juris Secondum states that the general rule on this question
is that the contractee, ordinarily, is not liable to the employees of the
independent contractor for injuries caused by the independent contrac-
tor.13 But there are exceptions to this general rule; the contractee is
liable where his direct negligence is the cause of the injuries to the
employees of the independent contractor.' 4 As pointed out above, these
exceptions, stated by Corpus Juris Secondum in sections 601 to 606, are
apparent exceptions; the real exceptions, while applicable to third parties,
do not extend to employees of the independent contractor. There is no
liability of the contractee to employees of the independent contractor
on the basis of respondeat superior. Thus Corpus Juris Secondum can
state that the contractee does not owe the same duties to employees of an
independent contractor as to third parties.
"Tenn.: Richardson v. U.S., 251 F. Supp. 107 (1966); Utah: Eutsler v. U.S., 376
F.2d 634 (1967); Wash.: Epperly v. City of Seattle, 65 Wash.2d 777, 399 P.2d
591 (1965).
'Ariz.: Welker v. Kennecott Copper Co., 1 Ariz. App. 395, 403 P.2d 330 (1965);
S. Dakota: Hagberg v. City of Sioux Falls, 281 F.Supp. 460 (1968).
"Cal.: Woolen v. Aerofet General Corp., 369 P.2d 708 (1962); Van Arsdale v.
Hollinger, 437 P.2d 508 (1968).
1357 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 600.
'"'While the contractee is not absolutely exempt in all cases from liability for in-
juries to a servant of the contractor or subcontractor, there being exceptions, dis-
cussed infra sections 601-606, to the general rule of nonliability, nevertheless he is
not liable unless he owed some duty to the employee, he failed to perform that duty,
and such non-performance was the proximate cause of the injury." Id.
1969]
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With this lack of uniformity in the case law, 15 it is impossible to state
what the weight of authority is. Some courts, in attempting to avoid
this confusion and conflict in the case law, have sought refuge in the
Restatement.'0 These courts have found particular comfort in the Special
Note to Chapter 15 of Tentative Draft No. 7 of the Restatement.17 This
Special Note states that the exceptions to the general rule of non-liability
on the part of the contractee for the torts of the independent contractor"
do not extend to the employees of either the contractor or the contractee.' 9
However, in the 39th Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute in
1962 which considered this portion of the Restatement, this Special Note
was specifically rejected upon the recommendation of the Reporter,
Dean William L. Prosser. The American Law Institute determined that
it would take a neutral position on the question of the liability of the
contractee to the employees of the independent contractor. 20 This neutral
position is reflected in the Restatement, as adopted, which makes no
mention of the problem.
The primarily reason for this lack of uniformity, which persuaded
the American Law Institute to adopt a neutral position, is the Work-
men's Compensation Acts of the particular jurisdictions and the third
party provisions under those acts. The pertinent section of Montana's
Workmen's Compensation Act is R.C.M. 1947, section 92-204:
Where both the employer and employee have elected to come under
this act,' the provisions of this act shall be exclusive, and such
election shall be held to be a surrender by such employer and the
servants, and employees of such employer and such employee, as
among themselves, of their right to any other method, form, or
kind of compensation. .. ."
"
6 While there is this lack of uniformity in respect to the generally recognized ex-
ceptions as stated in sections 410-429 of the Restatement, there is substantial author-
ity holding that where work is done upon the contractee's premises, of which the
employer is in possession and control, the employees of the contractor are invitees
or business visitors of the contractee, and consequently he has a duty to use reason-
able care to see that the premises are safe for the work. This instance of contractee
liability to employees of the independent contractor is stated in section 343 of the
Restatement.
"
6 Richardson v. U.S., 251 F. Supp. 107 (1966); Welker v. Kennecott Copper Co.,
1 Ariz. App. 395, 403 P.2d 330 (1965); Eutsler v. U.S., 376 F.2d 634 (1967);
Hagberg v. City of Sioux Falls, 281 F. Supp. 460 (1968).
7ToRTs at 17 (Tent. Draft No. 7).
-Id. §§ 410-429.
'"Again, when the Sections in this Chapter speak of liability to 'another' or 'other'
or to 'third persons' it is to be understood that the employees of the contractor, as
well as those of the defendant himself (the contractee), are not included." Supra,
note 17.
"'I think, therefore, that the paragraph at the bottom of page 17 should be rewritten,
an ask you to recommit it to me in order to take a strictly neutral position, point
out why the Restatement does not deal with employees at all, and say that, specific-
ally, we do not express any opinion whatever upon the matter one way or the other."
39 ALI PROCEEDINGS 246 (1962).
"In 1963 the Montana Legislature eliminated the right of election by employees
except in the case of officers of private corporations. See LAWS OF 1963, Chapter
95. So at the present time, as between employer and employee, the employee's remedy
is exclusivly under Workmen's Compensation.
[Vol. 31
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This section goes on to provide for third party liability where injury
is caused to the employee by the act or omission of some persons or
corporations other than his employer, or the servants or employees of
his employer. This third party liability is to be in addition to and
independent of Workmen's Compensation.
As noted supra, under the apparent exceptions to the independent
contractor rule, the contractee is liable for his own, direct negligence
and not on the basis of respondeat superior. Clearly, these exceptions
are available to the employee of the independent contractor under the
third party liability provision of section 92-204. In respect to the inde-
pendent contractor and his employee, the contractee is a third party
whose "act or omission" has injured the employee. There are no Mon-
tana cases, however, which deal with the recovery of the employee of an
independent contractor under the apparent exceptions to the independ-
ent contractor rule. 22
Whether the real exceptions (contractee's liability based upon re-
spondeat superior) to the independent contractor rule are available to
the employee of the independent contractor under section 92-204 is some-
what ambiguous. The statute states that Workmen's Compensation is
exclusive only as among the employer and his employees and the em-
ployee seeking recovery. This language would not exclude recovery
by the employee of an independent contractor against the contractee, a
third party to the employment relationship. If, however, the provision
of section 92-204 for third party liability is construed as limiting liability
outside the employment relationship to only the situation where the
third party has committed the "act or omission" injurious to the employee
of the independent contractor, the real exceptions would not be available
to that employee. Under the real exceptions, the contractee has com-
mitted no "act or omission"; rather, he is vicariously liable for the "act
or omission" of the independent contractor.
Montana case law does not appear to follow this narrow construction
of section 92-204. In Wells v. Stanley J. Thill and Associates, Inc.,23 em-
ployees of an independent contractor were injured in a trench cave-in
caused by the failure of the contractor to comply with minimum safety
standards and sued the contractee under the real exception to the inde-
pendent contractor rule involving inherently dangerous work.24  The
Montana Supreme Court noted that the employees were covered by
Workmen's Compensation but were allowed to bring the action under
2There is, however, dicta in O'Leary v. James & Wunderlich, 192 F.Supp. 462, 473
(1960), which appears to support the liability of the contractee to the employees
of the independent contractor under the apparent exceptions.
126 St. Rep. 152, 452 P.2d 1015 (1969).
"TORTS sections 416, 427, 427A.
1969]
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section 92-204. Thus it can be concluded that section 92-204 does not
prevent an employee of an independent contractor from seeking recovery
from the contractee under the real exceptions to the independent con-
tractor rule.
While the Montana case law allows recovery by third parties from
the contractee under the real exceptions to the independent contractor
rule,2 5 the result is different where recovery is sought by employees of
the independent contractor. In Wells v. Stanley J. Thill and Associates,
Inc., supra, the plaintiffs were denied recovery on the ground that the
real exception involving inherently dangerous work does not apply to
employees of an independent contractor. 26 Although the holding of this
case is confined to the real exception involving inherently dangerous
work, much of the dicta in the opinion indicates that the same rule would
apply to the other real exceptions. This dicta quotes at length Corpus
Juris Secondum concerning the duties of the contractee owed to em-
ployees of the independent contractor and to third persons. 27 The opin-
ion makes no distinction between real and apparent exceptions, but pre-
sumably the Montana Supreme Court would find, as Corpus Juris Secon-
dum does, that the apparent exceptions do apply to employees of the
independent contractor.
28
In West v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,29 the Federal District Court, Mon-
tana Division, Great Falls Division, seemingly applied a contra rule in
respect to the same real exception that was involved in Wells. An em-
ployee of a sub-contractor sued the general contractor for injuries sus-
tained when the employee slipped on oil which had leaked onto a trailer
bed from which the employee was unloading cylinders for welding.
(The relationship of general contractor and employee of sub-contractor
is the same as contractee and employee of independent contractor.) The
court denied recovery on the ground that the work was not inherently
dangerous. Impliedly, however, if the work had been inherently dan-
gerous, the employee would have recovered. Thus the real exception
involvoing inherently dangerous work would apply to the employee of
an independent contractor.
2Neyman v. Pincus, 82 Mont. 467, 267 P. 805 (1928); A.M. Holter Hardware Co. v.
Western Mfg. Co., 51 Mont. 94, 149 P. 489 (1915); Fagan v. Silver 57 Mont. 427,
188 P. 900 (1920); Fegles Const. Co. v. McLaughlin Const. Co., 205 F.2d 637 (1953);
Ulmen v. Schwieger, 92 Mont. 331, 12 P.2d 856 (1932). For a summary of Montana
case law see Hamman v. U.S., 267 F.Supp. 411 (1967).
21A second ground for denying recovery was that the contractee had not retained
control of the premises and therefore did not have a duty to the plaintiffs as in-
vitees to use reasonable care to see that the premises were safe for the work. See
note 15, supra; accord, flackley v. Waldorf-Hoerner Paper Co., 149 Mont. 286, 425
P.2d 712 (1967).
2757 C.J.S. Master and Servant section 600.
As noted supra, there are no Montana cases which consider whether the apparent
exceptions apply to employees of the independent contractor. See note 22, supra.
2294 F.Supp. 1336 (1969).
[Vol. 31
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Considering that this conclusion is drawn by implication and that
Wells is the later of the two cases, it is reasonable to conclude that Wells
reflects the present state of the law in Montana: the contractee may be
liable to the employees of the independent contractor under the apparent ex-
ceptions to the independent contractor rule, but not under the real ex-
ceptions thereto.
CONCLUSION
As noted supra, the trend in the law is that the courts are con-
structing more and more exceptions to the independent contractor rule.
That the Montana Supreme Court is responsive to this trend is illustrated
by Mr. Justice Bonner's dissent in Wells. Mr. Justice Bonner acknow-
ledged that the majority opinion "is founded on the present Montana
case law relating to the 'independent contractor, ", but he noted that
"this rule is founded on legal fiction born in days gone by which should
not know apply under modern conditions." The "modern conditions"
referred to are embodied in various provisions of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act which reflect the public policy that working men are to
be protected from death or injury. This public policy is frustrated
where compliance with safety s t a n d a r d s, promulgated to further
that public policy, is a v o i d e d by an independent contractor and
contractee. The contractee avoids compliance by employing the independ-
ent contractor, contracting to that contractor the responsibility for com-
pliance with the safety standards, then finding immunity from liability
for noncompliance under the independent contractor rule. The independ-
ent contractor fails to comply because he realizes that his employee's ex-
clusive remedy, as far as he is concerned, is under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, and it is more economical for him not to comply.
Mr. Justice Bonner concluded that if the contractee were denied
the immunity from liability provided by the independent contractor
rule, the public policy of Montana that workmen be protected would be
served:
It is now time for this Court to make another exception to the rule
relieving the contractee from liability. That exception should be
that where the legislature has set forth the public policy of the
state to protect workers; has decreed that certain occupations are
inherently hazardous; has authorized some board to formulate safety
standards to protect workers in those occupations, which standards
have been validly formulated, then a contractee may not by hiring
an independent contractor relieve himself of seeing that those stand-
ards are met. Such a rule would be another very narrow exception
to the general rule that a contractee is not liable for the torts of
his independent contractor and would at the same time promote
the public policy of this state to protect the life and limb of a
working man.'
OWELLS, 26 St. Rep. at 163.
1969]
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Undoubtedly, the contractee will face increasing liability to em-
ployees of the independent contractor, as well as to third parties, as
the courts, for reasons of public policy or otherwise, frame additional
exceptions to the independent contractor rule. It is not unreasonable
to conclude that ultimately the "general rule" will be that the con-
tractee is liable for the negligence of an independent contractor, and
that he will be excused only in a limited group of cases where he is
not in a position to select a responsible contractor, or the risk of any
harm to others from the enterprise is obviously slight.31
GARY WILSON
OlMorris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL.: L. REV.- (1935).
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